Innovation and managerial incentives: a tale of two systems

Lambertini, Luca (2004) Innovation and managerial incentives: a tale of two systems. p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1504.
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Abstract

This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
delegation, R&D, spillovers
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
15 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:31
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