Innovation and managerial incentives: a tale of two systems

Lambertini, Luca (2004) Innovation and managerial incentives: a tale of two systems. p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1504.
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This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
delegation, R&D, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:31

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