R&D incentives under Bertrand competition: a differential game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) R&D incentives under Bertrand competition: a differential game. p. 17. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1557.
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Abstract

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is sufficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
differential games, price competition, process innovation, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:33
URI

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