Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective

Bagnoli, Lindia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2013) Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche - DSE, p. 43. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3706. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (888). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the efficient investment profile, the surplus division norm may differ among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two different surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payoffs inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payoff cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bagnoli, Lindia
Negroni, Giorgio
Keywords
evolution,social norms, stochastically stable equilibrium, egalitarianism, inequality, Rawlsian division, modern hunter-gatherer societies.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
20 Jun 2013 11:34
Last modified
03 Oct 2013 08:03
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