Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2014) Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4073. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (962). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. The type of firms we focus on is workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximisers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, including the case of merger to monopoly.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
horizontal mergers, workers' co-ops
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Sep 2014 10:26
Last modified
16 Mar 2015 14:44
URI

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