Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2014) Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4091. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (972). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to credibly deter tacit collusion.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
tacit collusion, nationalization, mixed oligopoly
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
23 Oct 2014 13:12
Last modified
16 Mar 2015 14:31
URI

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