A simple mechanism for the roommate problem

Evci, Bora (2014) A simple mechanism for the roommate problem. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4100. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (975). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the roommate problem. The mechanism is successful in determining the reason of instability in our game scenario. And, we show that our mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the instance of instability.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Evci, Bora
Keywords
Roommate Problem, Stable Matching, Implementation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Nov 2014 09:22
Last modified
16 Mar 2015 14:30
URI

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