To know or not to know: Endogenous market structure when information can be strategically neglected

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. (2015) To know or not to know: Endogenous market structure when information can be strategically neglected. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 35. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4156. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (987). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study the firms’ choice of whether or not to consider pieces of information concerning their interdependence. In particular, any firm can strategically choose to consider or not the fact that industry output is affected by its own production choice. If this piece of information is considered, the firm behaves as an aligopolist; if not, firm behaves in a monopolistically competitive way. Thus, the market regime is endogenously determined. We show that different outcomes can emerge, depending on the number of firms, the degree of product substitutability and the cost structure.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P.
Parole chiave
information, strategic interaction, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, delegation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
14 Gen 2015 15:03
Ultima modifica
03 Mar 2015 10:21
URI

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