Government fiscal efforts vs. labour union strikes. Strategic substitutes or complements?

Castellani, Massimiliano ; Fanelli, Luca ; Savioli, Marco (2015) Government fiscal efforts vs. labour union strikes. Strategic substitutes or complements? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4285. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1013). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Castellani, Massimiliano
Fanelli, Luca
Savioli, Marco
Keywords
Fiscal efforts, strikes, strategic substitutes, policy-game, speed of adjustment
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2015 07:41
Last modified
23 Oct 2015 08:22
URI

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