The optimal scope of trade secrets law

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto ; Kaushik, Arun Kumar (2015) The optimal scope of trade secrets law. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4315. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1020). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The paper investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law. In the model, one innovative firm invests resources first to produce knowledge, and then to protect it from unwanted disclosure. A rival firm invests to ferret out this knowledge. Trade secrets law affects this "secrecy contest" by reducing the probability of unwanted disclosure given the efforts of the parties. We show how optimal trade secrets policy depends on structural market features and cost parameters. In the final section, we consider the limit case in which the innovation lies on the face of the product, and derive the optimal scope of legal provisions preventing copycat imitation of products (unfair competition, passing off).

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Kaushik, Arun Kumar
Keywords
trade secrets law, unfair competition, parasitic competition, slavish imitation, passing off
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
27 Jul 2015 09:11
Last modified
23 Oct 2015 09:04
URI

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