On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Delbono, Flavio (2015) On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4361. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1033). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Delbono, Flavio
Keywords
delegation, comparative performance, market share, sales, Cournot competition
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
06 Oct 2015 12:49
Last modified
23 Oct 2015 09:28
URI

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