Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement

Bigoni, Maria ; Fort, Margherita ; Nardotto, Mattia ; Reggiani, Tommaso (2011) Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 48. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4488. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (752). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bigoni, Maria
Fort, Margherita
Nardotto, Mattia
Reggiani, Tommaso
Keywords
education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:43
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:43
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