Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement

Bigoni, Maria ; Fort, Margherita ; Nardotto, Mattia ; Reggiani, Tommaso (2011) Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 48. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4488. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (752). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bigoni, Maria
Fort, Margherita
Nardotto, Mattia
Reggiani, Tommaso
Parole chiave
education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
28 Gen 2016 11:43
Ultima modifica
28 Gen 2016 11:43
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