Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution

Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro (2011) Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4491. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (749). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Keywords
MQS, environmental externality, product quality
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:53
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:53
URI

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