Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments

Giacomello, Giampiero ; Lambertini, Luca (2011) Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4502. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (739). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (398kB) | Preview

Abstract

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while a unilateral endowment of such weapons has destabilising consequences.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Giacomello, Giampiero
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
defensive shields, deterrence, wargames
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
02 Feb 2016 11:24
Last modified
02 Feb 2016 11:24
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^