Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior

Andergassen, Rainer (2009) Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 14. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4609. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (638). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm’s stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders’ trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Andergassen, Rainer
Keywords
executive compensation, fraud, incentives, product market competition
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
15 Feb 2016 13:53
Last modified
15 Feb 2016 13:53
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