Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems

Lambertini, Luca (2004) Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4796. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (498). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
delegation, R&D, spillovers
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Mar 2016 15:17
Last modified
09 Mar 2016 15:17
URI

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