Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems

Lambertini, Luca (2004) Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4796. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (498). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 498.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 (CC BY 2.5)

Download (177kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
delegation, R&D, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 15:17
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 15:17
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^