Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation

Colombo, Luca ; Lambertini, Luca (2002) Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4839. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (456). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 456.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (257kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with output levels.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Colombo, Luca
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
advertising, product quality, differential games, optimal control.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
14 Mar 2016 16:03
Ultima modifica
14 Mar 2016 16:03
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^