Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation

Colombo, Luca ; Lambertini, Luca (2002) Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4839. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (456). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with output levels.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Colombo, Luca
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
advertising, product quality, differential games, optimal control.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
14 Mar 2016 16:03
Last modified
14 Mar 2016 16:03
URI

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