Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaigne

Lambertini, Luca (2001) Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaigne. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4884. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (415). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

I nanlyse two differential games describing electoral campaigns where two candidates invest so as to increase the number of their respective voters.In both cases, parties overinvest and the number of voters is larger than in the social optimum. I extended both models to n candidates, so as to derive the socially optimal number of candidates. This yields non-univocal results, in that the number of candidates maximizing social welfare when a benevolent planner controls their efforts may be higher or lower than the optimal number of candidates given the non-cooperative investment behavior of parties, according to the shape of cost functions and he dynamic behavior of consensus associated with investment.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
elections, investment, consensus, differential games
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
17 Mar 2016 11:34
Last modified
17 Mar 2016 11:34
URI

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