Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects.

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2001) Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4897. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (404). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (601kB) | Preview

Abstract

We study a situation where the government influences consumers` behavior by providing both information and incentives. More generally, we propose a methodology for solving models of signl cum cheap talk. We develop the case of consumption choice in the presence of uncertainty nd external effects. The institutions used by delivering biased information to the misbehaver. We study the equilibrium trade-off between informing and giving incentives. Environmental tax policy, anti-smoking campaigns and policy against antibiotics over-consumption serve as illustration.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Barigozzi, Francesca
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
17 Mar 2016 11:19
Last modified
17 Mar 2016 11:19
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^