Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly with Technological Spillovers: A Welfare Re-Appraisal.

Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea (2000) Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly with Technological Spillovers: A Welfare Re-Appraisal. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 17. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4920. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (389). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (156kB) | Preview

Abstract

We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate R&D investments for process innovation. We establish that (i) firms always choose the Cournot behaviour; and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Keywords
price, quantity, R&D, spillovers
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Apr 2016 11:18
Last modified
01 Apr 2016 11:18
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^