Price vs Quantityin a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly.

Lambertini, Luca ; Schultz, Christian (2000) Price vs Quantityin a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 42. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4930. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (379). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an optimal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements. The reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Schultz, Christian
Keywords
partial collusion, product differentiation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 10:10
Last modified
05 Apr 2016 10:10
URI

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