Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5014. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (296). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared to the setting where firms act as pure profitmaximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
delegation, extended games, timing, roles
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 09:00
Last modified
05 Apr 2016 09:00
URI

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