Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 23. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5043. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (267). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Which shape market competition is likely to exhibit? This question is addressed in the present paper, where firms can choose whether to act as quantity or price setters, whether to move early or delay as long as possible at the market stage and finally whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial. Moreover, firms can endogenously determine the sequence of such decisions. It is shown that in correspondence of the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all firms first decide to delay, then to act as Cournot competitors, and finally stockholders decide to delegate control to managers. Hence, sequential play between either managerial or entrepreneurial firms, as well as simultaneous play between entrepreneurial firms are ruled out.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
delegation, extended game, distribution of roles.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Apr 2016 10:01
Last modified
01 Apr 2016 10:01
URI

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