Prisoners` Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Prisoners` Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5047. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (264). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners’ dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
Meta-game, supergame, prisoners’ dilemma.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
04 Apr 2016 09:31
Last modified
04 Apr 2016 09:31
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