Wage Indexation And Political Cycles

Scorcu, Antonello Eugenio (1996) Wage Indexation And Political Cycles. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5054. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (256). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

If the wage indexation rate is chosen discretionarily, a Left hand government lowers it in order to increase the output effects of surprise inflation, while a Right hand government prefers high indexation. These choices magnify the differences between the inflation rates preferred by the two parties. When binding commitments before the signature of the labor contract are possible, both parties prefer a higher wage indexation with respect to the discretionary situation, in order to reduce the inflationary bias.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Scorcu, Antonello Eugenio
Parole chiave
wage indexation, electoral cycle, monetary policy, time consistency
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
04 Apr 2016 15:16
Ultima modifica
25 Lug 2016 07:59
URI

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