No-Envy Arrow's Conditions

Denicolò, Vincenzo (1996) No-Envy Arrow's Conditions. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 12. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5066. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (243). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (124kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between the theory of distributive justice based on the concept of envy-freeness and Arrovian social choise theory. We define two conditions of No-envy and study their relationship with Arrow' scondition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a weakening of this condition called Personal States Independence and the condition of Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the power to veto (in a limited sense) at least one alternative (presumably, one alternative which is particularly unfair to him).

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
06 Apr 2016 10:56
Last modified
06 Apr 2016 10:56
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^