The Multiproduct Monopolist Under Vertical Differentiation: an Inductive Approach

Lambertini, Luca (1995) The Multiproduct Monopolist Under Vertical Differentiation: an Inductive Approach. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5087. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (226). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The behaviour of a multiproduct profit seeking monopolist is evaluated vis à vis that of a social planner, in a model where there is a continuum of consumers characterized by different marginal willingness to pay for quality. When the market is completely covered, the monopolist undersupplies all qualities as long as their number is finite. When quality becomes continuous, the richest consumer is provided with the socially optimal quality. Under the alternative assumption of partial market coverage, the monopolist supplies the same qualities as the social planner, restricting though total output. Finally, it turns out that, for a given number of varieties, under partial market coverage the monopolist can make at least as good as under full market coverage, so that she prefers to distort quantity rather than quality.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
monopoly, quality distortion, output restriction
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 May 2016 10:44
Last modified
05 May 2016 10:44
URI

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