Tax Amnesties, Plea Bargains and the Optional Enforcement Policy

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (1995) Tax Amnesties, Plea Bargains and the Optional Enforcement Policy. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 31. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5091. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (221). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper develops a model of tax enforcement in which the tax agency is allowed to make pre-audit settlement offers to taxpayers. Settlements can either take the form of public amnesties or individual plea bargains. In this model, pre-audit settlements allow the agency to overcome its limited control over the enforcement parameters (the agency takes the tax and penalty levels as given) and to increase its net revenue. Public amnesties prove to be superior to individual plea bargains, since they allow the agency to extract from taxpayers, not only the prospective defence cost, but also the risk premium associated with the sampling procedure.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Parole chiave
tax enforcement, tax amnesties, plea bargaining, auditing, renegotiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
28 Apr 2016 09:32
Ultima modifica
28 Apr 2016 09:32
URI

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