Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion

Lambertini, Luca (1995) Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 6. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5106. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (219). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is compared to that emerging in the case of price-setting behaviour. It turns out that quantity collusion is generally better sustained than price collusion, unless products are almost perfect substitutes. Under both quantity and price competition, the social damage associated with collusion is increasing in the degree of substitutability.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
Keywords
cartel stability, product differentiation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
06 May 2016 07:24
Last modified
06 May 2016 07:24
URI

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