Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1994) Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5121. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (205). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini (1993), we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 May 2016 08:11
Last modified
11 May 2016 08:13
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