Delegation and Product Differentiation

Lambertini, Luca (1993) Delegation and Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5184. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (173). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 Jun 2016 09:27
Last modified
10 Jun 2016 09:27
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