Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach

Sacco, Pier Luigi ; Scarpa, Carlo (1992) Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5222. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (138). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'. Quantity setting behavior (i.e., 'Cournot' behavior), is selected as an asymptotically stable state for the dynamics.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Sacco, Pier Luigi
Scarpa, Carlo
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
22 Giu 2016 08:17
Ultima modifica
22 Giu 2016 08:17
URI

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