Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach

Sacco, Pier Luigi ; Scarpa, Carlo (1992) Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5222. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (138). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'. Quantity setting behavior (i.e., 'Cournot' behavior), is selected as an asymptotically stable state for the dynamics.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Sacco, Pier Luigi
Scarpa, Carlo
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
22 Jun 2016 08:17
Last modified
22 Jun 2016 08:17
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