Quality Choice in a Vertically Differentiated Mixed Duopoly

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo ; Scarpa, Carlo (1991) Quality Choice in a Vertically Differentiated Mixed Duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 32. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5256. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (108). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We model a duopoly with a private and a public firm under the hypothesis of vertical product differentiation. Firms choose their quality levels first and then prices. We ask which firm will choose to serve the higher (lower) segment of the market. When firms act simultaneously in each stage, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria entailing opposite rankings between the quality levels. If the State-owned firm has a move advantage, then there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in which the public firm serves the upper segment of the market.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Scarpa, Carlo
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
01 Lug 2016 07:50
Ultima modifica
01 Lug 2016 07:50
URI

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