Indivisibilities in R & D Investment and Transient Leadership in Oligopoly

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo (1988) Indivisibilities in R & D Investment and Transient Leadership in Oligopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5362. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (52). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. The R&D technology displays increasing returns in the form of invisibilities. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and we prove that the incumbent has never greater probability of winning the patent race than the rival.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
19 Jul 2016 13:38
Last modified
19 Jul 2016 13:38
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