Asymmetric Races of Research and Development

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo (1988) Asymmetric Races of Research and Development. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 29. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5363. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (51). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. First we prove the existence and the properties of a noncooperative equilibrium. Then, we show that the higher (lower) the discount rate, the lower (higher) the probability of innovating of the current leader. In a specialised version of the model we establish the effect of the productivity of R&D espenditure, initial cost gap, and market size on the expected identity of the winner of the patent race.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
19 Jul 2016 13:36
Last modified
19 Jul 2016 13:36
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