Envy in Mission-Oriented Organizations

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Manna, Ester (2017) Envy in Mission-Oriented Organizations. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 47. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5703. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1108). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

According to the labor donation theory, workers adhering to their firms' mission are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor. In this paper, we study how workers' fairness concerns limit the firm's ability to extract labor donation from its employees. We find that, in sectors where the firm's mission is important, optimal contracts are such that high-ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low-ability employees and they must be rewarded with an “envy rent". The opposite is true in sectors where the firm's mission does not play a relevant role. We empirically test the predictions of the model using the German Socio-Economic Panel finding support for our theoretical results.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Barigozzi, FrancescaUniversità di Bologna0000-0002-4071-5161
Manna, EsterUniversitat de Barcelona0000-0002-6932-0577
Keywords
Mission-oriented organizations, envy, labor donations, screening
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Oct 2017 10:01
Last modified
15 Feb 2018 11:22
URI

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