Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Cremer, Helmuth ; Roeder, Kerstin (2017) Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5719. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1111). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (808kB) | Preview

Abstract

The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or split up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Speciffically, the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise not possible. Our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez-faire are not necessarily privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a penalty may effiectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Barigozzi, FrancescaUniversity of Bologna0000-0002-4071-5161
Cremer, HelmuthUniversity of Toulouse Capitole
Roeder, KerstinUniversity of Augsburg0000-0002-1183-1892
Keywords
marriage penalty, marriage bonus, proposal game, signaling
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
25 Oct 2017 13:45
Last modified
15 Feb 2018 11:24
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^