Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation

Colombo, Luca ; Lambertini, Luca (2002) Dynamic Advertising under Vertical Product Differentiation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/636.
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Abstract

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is en-dogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with output levels.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Colombo, Luca
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
advertising product quality differential games optimal control
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:59
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