Corruption and Decentralization

Carbonara, Emanuela (1999) Corruption and Decentralization. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/717.
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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in a hierarchical organization, where decentralization is intended as the delegation of control power to lower levels in a hierarchy. Decentral- ization causes a loss in control to the higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as, following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. Hence, decentralization, although creating agency problems inside an organization, can help in controlling corruption.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Carbonara, Emanuela
Keywords
Corruption Delegation Formal Authority Real Authority
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:02
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