Optimal firms' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2014) Optimal firms' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 20. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4048. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (955). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
mixed oligopoly, pollution, resource extraction
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4048
Data di deposito
10 Lug 2014 15:22
Ultima modifica
16 Mar 2015 14:54
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4048

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