On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation

Kopel, Michael ; Lambertini, Luca (2012) On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4211. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (807). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Kopel, Michael
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
managerial arms, Bertrand competition, delegation, equilibrium existence
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4211
Data di deposito
30 Mar 2015 13:16
Ultima modifica
31 Mar 2015 13:47
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4211

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