Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments

Giacomello, Giampiero ; Lambertini, Luca (2011) Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4502. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (739). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while a unilateral endowment of such weapons has destabilising consequences.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Giacomello, Giampiero
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
defensive shields, deterrence, wargames
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
02 Feb 2016 11:24
Ultima modifica
02 Feb 2016 11:24
URI

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