Is America Unrivaled? A Repeated Game Analysis

Lambertini, Luca (2006) Is America Unrivaled? A Repeated Game Analysis. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4724. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (563). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

I use a strategic setup to investigate whether unipolarism can indeed persist as a long run equilibrium. In a three-country world, a global power may subsidise two satellites so as to incentivate them not to invest to build up a coalition against it. I single out the conditions under which the one-shot game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma where no subsidy is paid and the coalition arises at equilibrium. Then, I revert to the infinitely repeated game and apply the Perfect Folk Theorem to characterise the critical thresholds of discount factor sustaining unipolarism at the subgame perfect equilibrium.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
29 Feb 2016 11:10
Ultima modifica
29 Feb 2016 11:10
URI

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