Workers' Enterprises Are Not Perverse: Differential Oligopoly Games with Sticky Price

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) Workers' Enterprises Are Not Perverse: Differential Oligopoly Games with Sticky Price. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4759. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (531). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the openloop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (1987) in a static framework.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
workers’ enterprise, price dynamics, feedbacks
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Mar 2016 09:45
Ultima modifica
15 Mar 2016 09:45
URI

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