R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) R&D Incentives under Bertrand Competition: A Differential Game. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 15. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4771. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (519). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is suficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
differential games, price competition, process innovation, spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
10 Mar 2016 10:37
Ultima modifica
10 Mar 2016 10:37
URI

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