Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?

Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero (2003) Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 8. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4800. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (494). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
Parole chiave
entry, vertical differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 15:08
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 15:08
URI

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