Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects.

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2001) Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4897. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (404). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study a situation where the government influences consumers` behavior by providing both information and incentives. More generally, we propose a methodology for solving models of signl cum cheap talk. We develop the case of consumption choice in the presence of uncertainty nd external effects. The institutions used by delivering biased information to the misbehaver. We study the equilibrium trade-off between informing and giving incentives. Environmental tax policy, anti-smoking campaigns and policy against antibiotics over-consumption serve as illustration.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Barigozzi, Francesca
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Mar 2016 11:19
Ultima modifica
17 Mar 2016 11:19
URI

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