Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards

Lambertini, Luca ; Ecchia, Giulio (1997) Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5025. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (285). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The consequences of the adoption of quality standards on the extent of market coverage is investigated by modelling a game between regulator and low-quality firm in a vertically differentiated duopoly. The game has a unique equilibrium in the most part of the parameter range. There exists a non-negligible range where the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. This result questions the feasibility of MQS regulation when firms endogenously determine market coverage.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Ecchia, Giulio
Parole chiave
Minimum Quality Standard, market coverage
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Apr 2016 08:02
Ultima modifica
05 Apr 2016 08:02
URI

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