Correlated accidents

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (2016) Correlated accidents. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5406. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1074). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper investigates cases in which harms are statistically correlated. When parties are risk averse, correlation plays an important role in the choice between liability rules. Specifically, positively correlated harms favor a liability rule that spreads the risk over a multitude of parties, as in the negligence rule. Negatively correlated harms favor a liability rule that pools risks together, as in strict liability. The same applies when parties can purchase costly insurance (first party or third party). This policy recommendation is in line with current products liability law, which places design defects and warning failures under a de facto negligence regime.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Franzoni, Luigi AlbertoUniversità di Bologna0000-0002-6116-5373
Parole chiave
negligence vs. strict liability, correlation, products liability
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
02 Set 2016 07:51
Ultima modifica
07 Giu 2017 09:06
URI

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