The signaling effect of tax policy

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Villeneuve, Bertrand (2004) The signaling effect of tax policy. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1506.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 500.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (297kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed on the effect of their consumption than the policy-maker. When he chooses the tax, the policy-maker optimizes both the incentive effect and the effect on beliefs. We show that optimal taxes under symmetric information are not implementable under asymmetric information. The tax distortion required for credibility depends on the marginal cost of public funds and brings to undertaxation.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Barigozzi, Francesca
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Parole chiave
tax policy, marginal cost of public funds, information bias, signaling.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:31
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^