Perfect uncontrollable differential games

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George (2004) Perfect uncontrollable differential games. p. 34. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1547.
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This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as ‘perfect uncontrollable’. We provide one example based on a model of oligopolistic competition in advertising efforts. We also present two oligopoly games where one property holds while the other does not, so that either (i) the open-loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect while the stackelberg one is time inconsistent, or (ii) the open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are only weakly time consistent.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Parole chiave
differential games, open-loop equilibria, time consistency, subgame perfection
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2006
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:32

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